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I. Introduction.
Intermunicipal agreements (hereinafter "IMAs") are versatile
instruments between and among municipalities that regulate a
specific area that impacts or infringes on more than one munici-
pality.1 For purposes of land use law, "localities may agree to
adopt compatible comprehensive plans and ordinances, as well as
other land use regulations, and to establish joint planning, zoning,
historic preservation, and conservation advisory boards, or hire
1. See JOHN NOLON, WELL GROUNDED (1st ed. 1998).
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joint inspection and enforcement officers."2 Any town, city, vil-
lage, or county has the ability to enter into this type of agree-
ment.3 The number of municipalities that enter into the
agreements can be anywhere from two to twenty and beyond.4 In-
termunicipal agreements may be entered into anywhere in New
York State.5 The evolution of these instruments has been slow,
but more municipalities are currently combining forces with
nearby communities to protect or regulate areas of importance. 6
Intermunicipal agreements were first introduced under the title
"Performance of municipal cooperative activities; alternative pow-
ers; alternative assignment of responsibilities" in the General Mu-
nicipal Law in 1960.7 The law created the notion of "municipal
cooperative activities"8 and set forth the framework for the formu-
lation of intermunicipal agreements. 9 General Municipal Law
Section 239-n, 10 entitled "Referral of certain proposed subdivision
plats to the county planning agency or regional planning council;
report thereon; final action,"11 and "Intergovernmental relations
councils,"1 2 gave communities the ability to create "intergovern-
mental relations councils."1 3 The statute sets forth a laundry list
of permitted activities by intergovernmental councils.1 4
2. Id. at 437.
3. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-o (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
4. See id.; N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 239-n (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
5. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 119-o, 239-n (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
6. See, e.g., Irondequoit Bay Management Project (July 1997) [hereinafter Iron-
dequoit] (on file with the author); Long Island Sound Watershed Intermunicipal
Council (1998) [hereinafter L.I. Sound] (on file with the author).
7. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-o (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 239-n (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The activities permitted by the statute are:
a. Making surveys and studies and conducting research programs to aid
in the solution of local government problems and in efforts to improve
administration and services.
b. Providing for the distribution of information resulting from such
surveys, studies and programs.
c. Consulting and cooperating with appropriate state, municipal and pub-
lic or private agencies in matters affecting municipal government.
d. Devising practical ways and means for obtaining greater economy and
efficiency in the planning and provision of municipal services and making
recommendations in accordance therewith.
e. Promoting the general commercial, industrial and cultural welfare of
the participating municipalities.
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These powers delegated to the municipalities within the state
of New York gave local governments the authority to cooperatively
regulate and implement programs that extended beyond their own
borders. 15 By creating the authority to enter into intermunicipal
agreements, the legislature effectively allowed the local govern-
ments to build on their Home Rule authority, accommodating the
protection of resources and preventing governmental problems. 16
Under New York General Municipal Law Section 239-n post,1 7
municipalities were given the option to enter into agreements
with neighboring communities.' The original purpose of this
statute was to create an intergovernmental relations council that
would promote more efficient use of resources, unify the local gov-
ernments, promote discussions as to cooperative services rendered
by participating governments, and find solutions to problems
shared by multiple municipalities.19 New York General Munici-
pal Law Sections 119-o and 239-n 2° were implemented sparingly
at best.21
f. Otherwise promoting strong and effective local government, public
health, safety, morals and general welfare by means of local and in-
tercommunity planning or performance of municipal services.
g. Employing such persons and adopting such rules and regulations as
shall be necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes of this section.
h. Providing a forum for local governments to explore and develop areas
for municipal cooperative activities pursuant to article five-G of this
chapter.
i. Operating as a purchasing consortium, where authorized by participat-
ing municipalities, for the purpose of obtaining economies through joint
bidding and purchasing.
j. Purchasing and making available to participating municipalities, where
authorized by participating municipalities, goods and equipment, includ-
ing but not limited to computer hardware and software.
k. Gathering and making available information on surplus goods and
equipment for sale or lease.
N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 239-n post (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
15. See id.
16. See Interview with John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace University School
of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 1999).
17. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 239-n post.
18. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 239-n post (1) (stating that intergovernmental re-
lations councils "shall have the power to" enter into agreements to perform the func-
tions stated above) (emphasis added).
19. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 239-n post (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992) (citing
legislative intent for 1983 Amendments, found in Historical Note Section of the code).
20. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW §§ 119-o, 239-n post (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
21. See Interview with John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace University School
of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 1999).
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In 1992, legislation was enacted permitting the application of
intermunicipal agreements to land use regulation. 22 The statutes
remained mostly unused until 1994, when municipalities began to
apply them to more than a shared planning board.23 The need for
a cohesive state with consistent laws has prompted municipalities
to dust off these statutes and put them to work. The walls built as
a result of Home Rule 24 isolated communities and compartmental-
ized the state.25
In an era of environmental protection and conservation, mu-
nicipalities may cooperate to preserve natural resources, wet-
lands, and historic districts. These agreements can be crafted in
many ways to protect many different areas of concern. 26 Home
Rule style authority must give way and release the communities
to create a comprehensive state where municipalities act coopera-
tively to conserve resources and protect areas that involve the
land of more than one municipality. Intermunicipal agreements
encourage municipalities to emerge from the primary stage of
Home Rule and evolve to a level of cooperation with neighboring
communities; allowing a "jurisdiction beyond their borders that
they could not get under the Home Rule authority alone."27
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate the increasing
need for communities to band together to protect natural re-
sources and historic districts within the state. Individualized
Home Rule authority, while still applicable to a majority of deci-
sions made by a municipality, must expand to include the in-
termunicipal agreement if resource conservation is to be
effective. 28 The legislatures, however, must make the decision to
act in the best interests of the communities for intermunicipal
agreements to be effective and worthy of the time and money in-
22. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. TowN
LAW § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); See also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
23. See, e.g., A Local Law Authorizing the Creation of a Joint Planning Board
with the Village of Nunda (1993) [hereinafter Nundal (on file with the author); Agree-
ment Creating Joint Town of Lowville/Village of Lowville Planning Board (Aug. 1982)
[hereinafter Lowville Planning] (on file with the author).
24. "Power granted to local and municipal authorities by state governments to
manage their own affairs as established by legislative act or constitutional provision."
GILBERT LAW DICTIONARY p. 116 (1994).
25. See N.Y. MuN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii) (McKinney 1994).
26. See NEW YORK DEP'T OF STATE, JAMES A. COON LOCAL GOVERNMENT TECHNI-
CAL SERIES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 1 (1998).
27. Interview with John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace University School of
Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 1999).
28. See id.
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vested in them by each participating municipality. 29 This com-
ment will also demonstrate how the intermunicipal agreement
has expanded and enhanced the Home Rule authority that has
been in place for so long. By allowing regulations to extend past
their borders, municipalities in New York State have realized how
effective, efficient, and beneficial cooperation with neighboring
communities can be.
Part II of this comment will discuss the background informa-
tion regarding the creation of intermunicipal agreements. Specifi-
cally, it will discuss how municipalities within the State of New
York used Home Rule authority to regulate their communities
prior to the legislature's introduction of intermunicipal agree-
ments. Part III will discuss intermunicipal agreements entered
into by municipalities in the State of New York prior to 1992.
Part IV will discuss intermunicipal agreements enacted in New
York State between the years of 1992 and 1993. Part V will dis-
cuss more recent intermunicipal agreements, drafted from 1994 to
the present. Part VI will compare and contrast the intermunicipal
agreements from the aforementioned categories and include sug-
gestions to municipalities regarding the most effective and effi-
cient mechanisms for regulation, preservation, and management
of their own communities in conjunction with neighboring munici-
palities. Part VII will discuss the future of intermunicipal
agreements.
II. Background.
A. Home Rule Authority
Home Rule authority is a quasi-constitutional grant of authority
to local governments to pass local laws relating to their prop-
erty, affairs or government, provided such local laws are consis-
tent with the constitution and general statutes of New York
State. Additionally, local governments may pass such local laws,
consistent with the constitution and general statutes, whether
or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of the
local government if the local law relates to one of numerous sub-
jects specifically listed by the State Legislature in the Municipal
Home Rule Law.30
29. See id.
30. Joe Stinson, The Home Rule Authority of New York Municipalities in the Land
Use Context (1997) (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.law.pace.edu/landuse/library/
stinso.html>.
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Home Rule authority enables municipalities to regulate mat-
ters of local concern within their borders. 31 Simply stated, Home
Rule is "the right of self-government as to local affairs."32 The
Home Rule method of self-regulation permitted municipalities to
regulate land use matters as they deemed appropriate. 33 One
community could regulate the use of incentive zoning,34 through
waiver of setback requirements, while a neighboring community
might use the increased floor area ratio to create the similar result
of affordable housing within the community. 35 The ability of mu-
nicipalities to self-regulate is crucial; the local legislature knows
better than the state how to best control the use of its land. Until
1960, municipalities were compartmentalized, individual entities
within the state, each exercising its own Home Rule authority.
The introduction of the statute creating intermunicipal agree-
ments 36 gave the communities the opportunity to venture beyond
their borders, enter joint agreements with neighboring communi-
ties, and in essence, share the task of deciding the most appropri-
ate ways to regulate. 37
B. Introduction of Intermunicipal Agreements
In 1960, General Municipal Law Section 119-o entitled "Per-
formance of Municipal Cooperative Activities; Alternative Powers;
Alternative Assignment of Responsibilities" was enacted. 38 It
states:
31. See John Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State-
Interests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV 497 (1993).
32. People v. State Board of Tax Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 431, 67 N.E. 69, 70-71
(1903).
33. See N.Y. MuN. HOME RULE LAw § 10(1)(ii)(a)(11) (McKinney 1994).
34. "A system by which zoning incentives are provided to developers on the condi-
tion that specific physical, social, or cultural benefits are provided to the community.
Incentives include increases in the permissible number of residential units or gross
square footage of development, or waivers of the height, setback, use, or area provi-
sions of the zoning ordinance. The benefits to be provided in exchange may include
affordable housing, recreational facilities, open space, day care facilities, infrastruc-
tures, or cash in lieu thereof." MARY E. MOHNACH & KATHRYN M. RYAN, WELL
GROUNDED DESKBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND PLANNERS 103 (1st ed. 1998).
35. See generally, Julie Solinski, Affordable Housing Law in New York, New
Jersey and Connecticut: Lessons for Other States, 8-FALL J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 36 (1998).
36. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-o (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
37. See Interview with John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace University School
of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 1999).
38. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
1999] 167
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Municipal corporations and districts shall have the power to
enter into, amend, cancel and terminate agreements for the per-
formance among themselves or one for the other of their respec-
tive functions, powers and duties on a cooperative or contract
basis or for the provision of a joint service or a joint water, sew-
age or drainage project. 39
The statute sets forth, in extensive detail, who must approve
the agreement and what can be contained within the agreement. 40
The agreement "shall be approved by each participating municipal
corporation or district by a majority vote."4 1 No municipality can
monopolize the terms of the agreement. 42 The statute also sets
forth the "managerial" provisions of the agreement which could
include43 the management of personnel, assignment of liability
from the project, and allocation of funds for the project. 44 The list
is not exclusive and the statute explicitly provides a "catch-all,"
permitting other matters to be included within the agreement. 45
Since the adoption of this statute, in an effort to cooperate
with surrounding communities, municipalities have attempted to
create intermunicipal agreements for topics from airports to youth
programs.46 The State Comptroller has deemed most of the pro-
posed uses appropriate. Some limitations, however, have been
set.47 For example, a county may not sell gravel to towns even
though that same county and town can operate a gravel pit coop-
eratively.4s Other actions have been barred as the premise for in-
termunicipal agreements: a town and village may not share the
cost of the erection of a village firehouse, 49 a county and a town
cannot share a police force, 50 and without joint control, a city and
a county cannot share the maintenance of a city-owned airport.51
These restrictions notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of
opinions set forth by the State Comptroller and Attorney General
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. (citing Notes of Decisions).
47. See, e.g., 20 Op. State Comptroller 65 (1964), Op State Comptroller 91-14
(1991); (see appendix A).
48. See Op. State Comptroller 83-104 (1983); (see appendix A).
49. See Op. State Comptroller 26-244 (1970); (see appendix A).
50. See Op. State Comptroller 78-603; (see appendix A).
51. See 25 Op. State Comptroller 42 (1969); (see appendix A).
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have approved intermunicipal agreements as appropriate under
this statute.52
The statute also provides for "mutual sharing plans,"s sub-
ject to the provisions set forth for intermunicipal agreements.
Joint service is prohibited under a mutual sharing plan if an in-
termunicipal agreement prepared pursuant to this statute already
exists.54 These sharing plans apply to municipal corporations
rather than individual municipalities. 55
The companion statute to General Municipal Law Section
119-o is General Municipal Law Section 239-n, which delineates
intergovernmental relations councils. 56 Intergovernmental rela-
tions councils may be established by "[a] ny county outside the city
of New York, city, town, village, school district, board of coopera-
tive educational services, or fire district."57 The statute itself lists
reasons why a council should be created.58 These councils have
the power to encourage commercial and industrial welfare of in-
volved municipalities 59 and preserve the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the communities through the use of planning or municipal
services. 60
C. Introduction of Intermunicipal Agreements in Land Use
Law
In years past, communities implemented the intermunicipal
agreement sparingly, usually to share a planning board.61 Follow-
ing the enactment of the statutes that enabled municipalities to
apply intermunicipal agreements to land use law,62 the use of this
instrument increased. All four of the statutes, the General Munic-
ipal Law, the General City Law, the Town Law, and the Village
52. For example, joint ambulance service (20 Op. State Comptroller 65, (1964)),
joint jail (Op. Att'y Gen. 91-Fl), and garbage collection (Op. State Comptroller 91-14).
53. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o(3) (Supp. 1992).
54. See id. at § 119-o(3)(c).
55. See id. at § 119-o(3).
56. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 239-n (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
57. Id. at § 239-n(1).
58. See id (providing that such councils should be created "to strengthen local
governments and to promote efficient and economical provision of local governmental
services.")
59. See id. at § 239-n(1)(e).
60. See id. at § 239-n(1)(f).
61. See Lowville Planning, supra note 23.
62. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. TowN
LAW § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); see also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
1999]
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Law, are identical in title and language.63 The legislature made
its intent clear by the statutory language that it composed: "the
legislature seeks to promote intergovernmental cooperation that
could result in increased coordination and effectiveness of compre-
hensive planning and land use regulation, more efficient use of
infrastructure and municipal revenues, as well as the enhanced
protection of community resources, especially where such re-
sources span municipal boundaries."64 The realization that there
were numerous natural resources and historic districts requiring
protection prompted the legislature to resurrect a device that had
lain dormant for thirty years. 65 The application of intermunicipal
agreements to land use law encouraged communities to work co-
operatively to protect and preserve those resources infringing on
more than one municipality. 66 The statutes set forth five areas
that municipalities may regulate through intermunicipal
agreements:
(a) create a consolidated planning board67 which may re-
place individual planning boards, if any, which consolidated
planning board shall have the powers and duties as shall be de-
termined by such agreement;
(b) create a consolidated zoning board of appeals 68 which
may replace individual zoning boards of appeals, if any, which
consolidated zoning board of appeals shall have the powers and
duties as shall be determined by such agreement;
63. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g; N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
741; see also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 119-u.
64. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g; N.Y. ToWN LAw § 284; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741;
see also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 119-u.
65. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g; N.Y. ToWN LAW § 284; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
741; see also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 119-u.
66. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g; N.Y. ToWN LAW § 284; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
741; see also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 119-u.
67. "Planning boards may be delegated reviewing board functions and a variety of
advisory functions, including the preparation of the comprehensive plan, drafting zon-
ing provisions, or suggesting site plan and subdivision regulations, in addition to
other functions." JOHN NOLON, WELL GROUNDED 442 (lst ed. 1998).
68. "The essential function of the zoning board of appeals is to grant variances. In
this capacity it protects landowners from the unfair application of the laws in particu-
lar circumstances. The zoning board of appeals also hears appeals from the decisions
of the zoning enforcement officer or building inspector when interpretations of the
zoning ordinance are involved." Id. at 447.
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(c) create a comprehensive plan6 9 and/or land use regula-
tions which may be adopted independently by each participating
municipality;
(d) provide for a land use administration and enforcement
program which may replace individual land use administration
and enforcement programs, if any, the terms and conditions of
which shall be set forth in such agreement; and
(e) create an intermunicipal overlay district 70 for the pur-
pose of protecting, enhancing, or developing community re-
sources that encompass two or more municipalities.
7 1
The majority of the intermunicipal agreements entered into
prior to the enactment of these statutes focused on the sharing of
a land use board; planning or zoning appeals. 72 In recent years,
the communities have begun to enter into intermunicipal agree-
ments utilizing the overlay district to protect natural resources. 73
Overlay zoning is "a mapped overlay district superimposed on one
or more established zoning districts [which] may be used to im-
pose supplemental restrictions on uses in these districts, permit
uses otherwise disallowed, or implement some form of density bo-
nus or incentive bonus program."74 "Overlay zoning, through the
use of optional and mandatory requirements, can be used to serve
three functions. First, overlay zoning can encourage certain types
of development. Second, it can discourage certain types of devel-
opment. And third, it can offer protection to certain areas."75
An overlay district can be created by the legislature to protect
or regulate a specific area.7 6 Overlay zoning "allows a local gov-
69. "A comprehensive plan is a written document that identifies the goals, objec-
tives, principles, guidelines, policies, standards, and strategies for the growth and de-
velopment of the community." Id. at 432.
70. "An overlay zone is a zone or district created by the local legislature for the
purpose of conserving natural resources or promoting certain types of development.
Overlay zones are imposed over existing zoning districts and contain provisions that
are applicable in addition to those contained in the zoning law." Id. at 442.
71. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(4) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. TowN LAW
§ 284(4) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741(4) (McKinney
1995); and N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-u(4) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
72. See, e.g., Nunda, supra note 23; see also Lowville Planning, supra note 23.
73. See, e.g., L.I. Sound, supra note 6; see also Historic River Towns of Westches-
ter Intermunicipal Agreement (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter Historic River Towns] (on file
with theauthor).
74. Ziegler, Rathkopfs The Law of Zoning and Planning §8.01[3] (1995).
75. Matt Bovoso and Timothy Jones, Overlay Zoning, (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http:law.pace.edu/landuse/library/overla.html>.
76. See id.
1999]
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ernment to vary its regulations within the same basic use zone." 77
It "allows local officials to designate boundaries of natural re-
source or economic development districts."78 This district is used
so municipalities are not required to revamp or redraft their en-
tire zoning district map to accommodate one specific area.79 This
form of zoning creates "new regulations applicable to the special
area [which] is overlaid upon (added to) the regulations of the
zones already in existence there."80 For example, if a municipality
decides that it wants to protect a wetland, it creates an overlay
zone.81 The overlay zone and the new regulations apply only to
the wetland, thus saving the municipality the expense of redraft-
ing its zoning map for one minor adjustment.8 2 Overlay districts
may be used in a variety of instances including wetland preserva-
tion, conservation of wildlife in a particular area, and in-
termunicipal agreements.8 3
D. Implementation of Land Use Intermunicipal Agreements
A myriad of elements exists that may be included in an in-
termunicipal agreement. These can range from the frequency of
meetings to who is in charge of the revenue raised to implement
the agreement.8 4 There is no set standard or checklist for an in-
termunicipal agreement. Usually, the issues that the municipali-
ties find important make up the body of the agreement.
Furthermore, there are some threads of consistency within in-
termunicipal agreements in general. Issues commonly addressed
in intermunicipal agreements include: the purpose for the crea-
77. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 61 (1st ed.
1981).
78. John Nolon, Flexibility in the Law: Reengineering of Zoning to Prevent Frag-
mented Landscapes, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1998, at 5.
79. See Interview with John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace University School
of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 1999).
80. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 61 (1st ed.
1981).
81. See id.
82. See generally, Matt Bovoso and Timothy Jones, Overlay Zoning, (visited Jan.
27, 1999) <http:law.pace.edu/landuse/library/overla.html>.
83. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 61 (1st ed.
1981).
84. See, e.g., Forestville-Chautauqua Water Resource Development (Dec. 1992)
[hereinafter Forestville-Chautauqua] (on file with the author); see also Lowville Coop-
erative Zoning Board of Appeals (July 1982) [hereinafter Lowville ZBA] (on file with
the author).
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tion of the intermunicipal agreement,8 5 the acquisition of funding
for the particular project,8 6 and the responsibilities of the ap-
pointed members.8 7 The agreement may be as simple or complex
as the municipalities choose to make it.88 The progression of the
use of the intermunicipal agreements has been slow. In recent
years, however, more communities are finding it in their best in-
terest to cooperate with surrounding communities to preserve and
restore the natural resources located within their boundaries.8 9
Another reason for the creation of an intermunicipal agreement
may be to promote the economic welfare of a specific area, through
increased tourism.90
III. Intermunicipal Agreements Enacted Prior to 1992
Many of the intermunicipal agreements entered into under
the authority of General Municipal Law Sections 119-o and 239-
n 9' were limited in two respects: the number of participating mu-
nicipalities and the reasons for the establishment of the agree-
ments. The early intermunicipal agreements included between
two and six municipalities, or governmental bodies.92 Accord-
ingly, these participants created and entered into agreements that
provided cooperation on very specific topics such as joint planning
boards,93 assessment and development of a specific municipality's
85. See, e.g., Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6; see also Historic River Towns, supra
note 73.
86. See, e.g., Cooperation Agreement Between County of Nassau, the town of
North Hempstead, Village of Baxter Estates, Village of Manorhaven, Village of Port
Washington North, Village of Plandome, Village of Plandome Manor, Village of
Plandome Heights, Village of Great Neck, Village of Thomaston, Village of Kingston,
Village of Kings Point, Village of Sands Point (1995) [hereinafter Manhasset Bay] (on
file with the author); see also An Intermunicipal Agreement Establishing Kendall,
Yates, Carlton (KYC) Lake Ontario Cooperative Waterfront Board (July 1984) [here-
inafter KYC] (on file with the author); see also Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
87. See, e. g., L.I. Sound, supra note 6; see also Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6.
88. See, e.g., Mianus River Resolution (November 1992) [hereinafter Mianus
River] (on file with the author); see also Town of DeKalb Site Plan Review Law (March
1992) [hereinafter DeKalb-Richville] (on file with the author).
89. See, e.g., Historic River Towns, supra note 73; see also Irondequoit Bay, supra
note 6.
90. See, e.g., Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
91. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 119-o, 239-n (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
92. See, e.g., Lowville Planning, supra note 23 and Lowville ZBA, supra note 84
(two participants); Flint Creek Plan Agreement (September 1977) [hereinafter Flint
Creek] (on file with the author) (six participants).
93. See, e.g., Lowville Planning, supra note 23; Lowville ZBA, supra note 84.
13
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
water supply,94 and improvements for a watershed drainage
system. 95
A. Flint Creek Watershed Plan Agreement
One of the earliest intermunicipal agreements, the "Flint
Creek Watershed Plan Agreement" (hereinafter "Flint Creek")96
was entered into in New York State in 1976. 97 The Flint Creek
Small Watershed Protection District was unique in that no spe-
cific municipalities entered into the agreement. 98 The partici-
pants were: the Ontario County Board of Supervisors, the Yates
County Legislature, the Soil and Water Conservation District for
Ontario County, the Soil and Water Conservation District for
Yates County, and the Soil and Water Conservation District for
Stuben County.99 This group was collectively known, for purposes
of this agreement, as "the Sponsoring Local Organization." 100 The
State of New York and the Soil Conservation Service, United
States Department of Agriculture (hereinafter "Soil Conservation
Service"), joined the Sponsoring Local Organization in the agree-
ment. 10 1 The primary purpose of this agreement was to imple-
ment improvements in watershed drainage systems within five
years.10 2 The organization planned to purchase land rights for the
implementation of the proposed improvements. 0 3
The attention to the financial responsibilities of each party in
this agreement is very elaborate and extensive. 10 4 This agree-
ment sets out, in detail, how the parties were to acquire the
land. 105 The agreement further broke down the economic respon-
sibilities of the Sponsoring Local Organization 10 6 and the Soil
94. See, e.g., Contract Between City of Dunkirk and Village of Fredonia (July
1993) [hereinafter Dunkirk-Fredonia] (on file with the author).
95. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
96. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
97. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
98. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
99. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
100. See Flint Creek, supra note 92, at i.
101. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
102. See Flint Creek, supra note 92, at i.
103. See Flint Creek, supra note 92, at i.
104. See Flint Creek, supra note 92, at ii.
105. Paragraph two of the agreement includes the percentages of funding from
each party for the relocation costs. See Flint Creek, supra note 92, at ii.
106. Project Administration Cost to Sponsoring Local Organization: $34,400. See
id. at iii.
174 [Vol. 17
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss1/6
1999] INTERMUNICIPAL AGREEMENTS 175
Conservation Service. 10 7 The agreement clearly states, however,
that it is "not a fund obligating document. Financial and other
assistance to be furnished by the [Soil Conservation] Service in
carrying out the plan is contingent on the availability of appropri-
ations for this purpose."108 The parties agree that the amounts in
this agreement are estimated, and that a supplementary agree-
ment will be created delineating the division of finances.10 9
Attached to this agreement is a summary of the plan (herein-
after "Flint Creek Summary").' 10 This summary basically reiter-
ates the terms of the agreement. It also illustrates the specific
reasons for erecting the agreement 1 ' and provides a detailed de-
scription of the proposed land treatment measures designed to
curtail the problems arising in this area." 2
B. Cooperative Tug Hill Council Intermunicipal Agreement
In 1981, the Town Boards of Boylston, Florence, Lewis, Mon-
tague, Osceola, Pinckney, Redfield, Turin, West Turin, and Worth
created the Cooperative Tug Hill Planning Board (hereinafter
"Tug Hill"). 1 3 This board was to serve as the planning board for
all the municipalities that were parties to the agreement. 1 4 The
municipalities had already been cooperating in "the planning of
local land use and.., land management activities."" 15 The board
was to perform six specific functions or services." 6 Section II of
the agreement lists the functions as follows:
(a) Coordinate the efforts of the individual towns in the re-
view and adoption process of a Rural Development Code and
provide assistance to the individual towns as may be needed.
107. The Soil Conservation Service was required to pay one hundred percent of the
cost of all structural materials used for works of improvement, estimated at
$1,216,000; one hundred percent of the engineering costs for all structural materials
for works of improvement, estimated at $156,000; and $165,800 for Project Adminis-
tration Cost. See Flint Creek, supra note 92, at ii-iii.
108. See Flint Creek, supra note 92, at iii.
109. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
110. See Flint Creek Summary, supra note 92, at I-1.
111. For example, some of the problems faced in the Flint Creek area were inunda-
tion, floodwater damage and erosion. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
112. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
113. See Cooperative Tug Hill Planning Board (July 1981) [hereinafter Tug Hill]
(on file with the author).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 1.
116. See Tug Hill, supra note 113, at 1.
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(b) Undertake continued cooperative planning studies and
functions, including matters affecting the central forest, water-
shed, and other natural characteristics of the participating
municipalities.
(c) Make reports on planning studies to the various gov-
erning bodies, either with or without request.
(d) Exercise the budgeting and fiscal supervision and re-
lated functions as described hereinafter.
(e) Review matters referred by any of the governing bodies,
by the Cooperative Board of Appeals, or the cooperative enforce-
ment officers, of the Code Enforcement Committee with recom-
mendations to the referring person or office.
(f) Report at least annually to governing bodies of partici-
pating municipalities concerning the activities of the coopera-
tive board.117
The agreement authorizes the designation and appointment
of a fiscal agent, responsible for all the funding and financial as-
pects of the planning board. 118 The agreement also stipulates an
annual budget, subject to approval by the Board. 119 This agree-
ment included a provision allowing for additional municipalities
to join,120 a section not present in previously mentioned in-
termunicipal agreements. Interested municipalities would be ad-
ded to the planning board through the amendment procedure set
forth in the agreement.' 2 1
In 1991, the parties to this agreement realized that there was
a maturation and growth to its planning board. 22 The parties,
having operated the planning board for ten years, realized that
the responsibilities originally set forth on paper were insufficient
in practice. 123 The municipalities sharing the planning board
amended the 1981 agreement and tailored it to the planning board
it had already created. 24 Instead of listing the functions and
services to be performed and provided by the planning board, 25
the 1991 amendment enumerated eight primary objectives to be
117. See Tug Hill, supra note 113, at 1.
118. See Tug Hill, supra note 113, at 1.
119. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
120. See Tug Hill, supra note 113, at 2.
121. See Tug Hill, supra note 113, at 2.
122. See Cooperative Tug Hill Intermunicipal Agreement (as revised 1991) [herein-
after Tug Hill 1991 Amendment] (on file with the author).
123. See id.; see also Tug Hill, supra note 113.
124. See Tug Hill 1991 Amendment, supra note 122.
125. See Tug Hill supra note 116.
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achieved by the planning board.126 The primary objectives, which
replaced the function section of the 1981 agreement, are as
follows:
(1) To provide staff who will, through regular contact with
participating municipalities identify problem areas and needed
services, and who will coordinate activities designed to address
such issues.
(2) To establish a representative forum by which issues and
opportunities of common or individual concern can be affected,
both through making recommendations for action, as well as
through providing direct support to local government activities.
(3) To establish a communication system by which all repre-
sentatives to the Cooperative Tug Hill Council (hereinafter
"CTHC") report on a regular basis to their respective governing
boards.
(4) To explore all avenues of cooperation by and between
participating municipalities.
(5) To visualize the future from a big picture or multitown
perspective and to create opportunities through cooperation for
achieving such vision.
(6) To retain the rural character of the CTHC area through
a home rule approach recognized in state legislation. This ap-
proach would rely primarily on special area designations by
each town, and a plan for the entire CTHC region.
(7) To provide technical and project review assistance, as
requested, to CTHC towns when development is proposed in
designated special areas, and when projects of CTHC-region-
wide significance are proposed.
(8) To carry out project review in cooperation with affected
towns when development is proposed in a special area overlap-
ping or immediately adjacent to a boundary between two or
more CTHC towns, or when the project might have CTHC-re-
gion-wide impact. 127
The Tug Hill 1991 Amendment also added five municipalities
to the planning board, expanding the participants to fifteen com-
munities. 128 The provisions of the agreement common to in-
termunicipal agreements remained substantially the same.
1 29
126. See Tug Hill 1991 Amendment, supra note 124.
127. See Tug Hill 1991 Amendment, supra note 124.
128. The Town Boards of the Towns of Harrisburg, Leyden, Lorraine, Martinsburg
and Rodman joined the amended agreement. See Tug Hill 1991 Amendment, supra
note 122.
129. See Tug Hill 1991 Amendment, supra note 122.
1999]
17
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
C. Agreement for the Creation of a Joint Town/Village
Planning Board
In 1982, the Town of Lowville and the Village of Lowville en-
tered into an "Agreement for the Creation of a Joint TownNillage
Planning Board" (hereinafter "Lowville Planning"). 130 Under the
agreement creating a joint planning board, the town and the vil-
lage would share a planning board that would "exercise all func-
tions as outlined in the adopted bylaws." 13 1 The planning board
was comprised of two members appointed by the town, two mem-
bers appointed by the village, and one member appointed by the
town and village jointly for a total of five members.13 2 The agree-
ment delineated the terms of each member's appointment 133 and
the procedure for appointment upon the expiration of the initial
terms of service by the planning board members.134 The only
mention of finances in this agreement was the provision for the
appointment of a fiscal agent by the Town of Lowville.135
The town and village executed an agreement for a "Coopera-
tive Zoning Board of Appeals" (hereinafter "Lowville ZBA")' 36 on
the same day as Lowville Planning. 137 The provisions for the zon-
ing board of appeals were similar in nature to those in the plan-
ning board agreement. 138 Unlike Lowville Planning, Lowville
ZBA included a provision for the creation of a position called the
"Cooperative Enforcement Officer."139 This position was created
"following [a] review of qualifications to perform those functions as
shall be agreed upon by both municipalities and outlined in a job
description."140
130. See Lowville Planning, supra note 23, at 1.
131. See Lowville Planning, supra note 23.
132. See Lowville Planning, supra note 23.
133. See Lowville Planning, supra note 23.
134. See Lowville Planning, supra note 23.
135. See Lowville Planning, supra note 23, at 2.
136. See Lowville ZBA, supra note 84, at 1.
137. These agreements for a joint planning board and cooperative zoning board of
appeals for the Town of Lowville and the Village of Lowville were entered into on July
20, 1982. See supra notes 136, 142.
138. Compare Lowville ZBA, supra note 84 at 1 with Lowville Planning, supra note
23, at 1.
139. See Lowville ZBA, supra note 84, at 2.
140. See Lowville ZBA, supra note 84, at 2.
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D. An Intermunicipal Agreement Establishing Kendall, Yates,
Carlton (KYC) - Lake Ontario Cooperative Waterfront
Board
An interesting example of an intermunicipal agreement en-
tered into before the enactment of the 1992 statutes 141 is "An In-
termunicipal Agreement Establishing Kendall, Yates, Carlton
(KYC) Lake Ontario Cooperative Waterfront Board" (hereinafter
"KYC"). 142 This agreement, entered into eight years before the en-
actment of the 1992 statutes, 143 is unique because it created a co-
operative board to draft and implement a Waterfront
Revitalization Program. 4 4 This is one of the few agreements en-
acted prior to the 1992 statutes 145 that shows an incentive to pro-
tect natural resources.
There were four participating municipalities, Orleans County
and the Towns of Kendall, Yates and Carlton.146 This 1984 agree-
ment established a Cooperative Board to create and oversee a Lo-
cal Waterfront Revitalization Program (hereinafter "LWRP").147
It set forth the extent of the authority granted to the board as well
as the functions it was required to perform. 148 The committee's
duties included: the preparation of the LWRP on behalf of the
towns involved;149 authorization to seek "technical and planning
assistance"150 from the Orleans County Planning and Develop-
ment Department; 151 providing reports to participating communi-
ties regarding the planning and research done by the Cooperative
Board;152 and the recommendation of ways to revitalize the
waterfront. 153
141. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. ToWN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); and N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
142. KYC, supra note 86.
143. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. ToWN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); and N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
144. See KYC, supra note 86.
145. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. ToWN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); and N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
146. See KYC, supra note 86.
147. See KYC, supra note 86, at 1.
148. See KYC, supra note 86.
149. See KYC, supra note 86.
150. KYC, supra note 86, at 1.
151. See KYC, supra note 86.
152. See KYC, supra note 86, at 1.
153. See KYC, supra note 86.
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This agreement delineated in extensive detail the construc-
tion of operations for the newly created Cooperative Board.'
54
Some of the operations considered and decided upon by the draft-
ers of the agreement included the appointment of a fiscal agent,
155
the production of an annual report detailing the activities of the
Board, 156 and how the Cooperative Board and the LWRP may be
terminated. 157 This agreement was created eight years before the
legislature enacted statutes permitting the application of in-
termunicipal agreements to land use topics.' 5 8 The KYC agree-
ment demonstrates the ability of municipalities to enter into
agreements to regulate just about anything.159 This agreement
was before its time because it found power within the 1960 stat-
utes160 that other communities did not utilize until the introduc-
tion of the 1992 statutes. 161
E. Horizons Waterfront Commission Intermunicipal
Cooperation Agreement
The Towns of Brant, Evans, Hamburg, and Tonawanda; the
Cities of Lackawanna, Buffalo, and Tonawanda; the County of
Erie; and the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority entered
into the "Horizons Waterfront Commission Intermunicipal Coop-
eration Agreement" (hereinafter "Horizons Waterfront") 162 in
1988. The primary objective of this agreement was the "protection
of Erie County's ninety miles of waterfront" 163 as an important
area for the revitalization of that region. 164 The municipalities re-
alized there were many economic opportunities available to them
154. See KYC, supra note 86.
155. See KYC, supra note 86, at 2.
156. See KYC, supra note 86.
157. See KYC, supra note 86.
158. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. TowN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); and N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
159. See generally KYC, supra note 86.
160. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 119-o, 239-n (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992) (al-
lowing intermunicipal agreements in a more general manner than the 1992 statutes).
See KYC, supra note 86.
161. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. ToWN
LAW § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(McKinney
1995); and N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
162. See Horizons Waterfront Commission Intermunicipal Cooperation Agreement
(1988) [hereinafter Horizons Waterfront] (on file with the author).
163. Id. at 1.
164. See id.
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through the preservation of this area. 165 The municipalities also
realized the need for cooperation among themselves in order to
preserve and efficiently reap the benefits of a waterfront area at-
tractive to tourists and the members of surrounding communi-
ties. 166 The communities wanted to achieve six goals by way of
this agreement. The goals were:
1. The development, adoption and updating of a Master
Plan for Erie County's waterfront.
2. Receiving and distributing state, federal and other funds
to carry out waterfront development projects.
3. The designation of a lead agency to carry out specific de-
velopment projects.
4. The coordination of the activities of all governmental en-
tities in the development of the waterfront.
5. Acting as a developer of last resort when a development
project cannot be effectively and appropriately carried out by a
local entity.
6. Coordinating and focusing private investment and devel-
opment efforts. 167
This agreement extensively describes the Commission's vot-
ing members and how the fifteen members are to be chosen. 168
The primary project set before the Commission was the develop-
ment of a master plan for the waterfront. The agreement details
what should be included in the plan, the number of votes needed
for approval of the plan, and the process for amendment of the
plan. 169
The termination date of this agreement was set for December
31, 1999.170 However, the termination came much sooner than
165. Some of the opportunities listed in the agreement are "recreational, housing,
commercial, industrial, transportation and other uses." Id. at 1.
166. "[Tlhe Parties mutually agree that the only way to properly plan and imple-
ment the multi-year, multi-million dollar development and redevelopment of the wa-
terfront is through a unified planning and implementation process." Id. at 1.
167. Id. at 1-2.
168. Seven of the members are appointed by the County Executive, three members
appointed by the Mayor of Buffalo, two appointments by the Governor of New York
State, one by the Buffalo Common Council, one by the Erie County Legislature and
one appointment by the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority. The chairman of
the Commission was to be appointed by the Governor of New York State. See Hori-
zons waterfront, supra note 162.
169. See Horizons Waterfront, supra note 162.
170. See Horizons Waterfront, supra note 162, at 5.
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the municipalities expected 171 because Governor George Pataki
determined that the preservation of the waterfront was better left
to a newly created economic development office.172 The elimina-
tion of the Commission was met with opposition in the participat-
ing communities.1 73 The County Executive was quoted in an
article as stating, "the governor doesn't understand what the wa-
terfront means to this community, and the potential it holds." 174
Even those participating in the agreement were opposed to the
dissolution of the Commission. An article on the editorial page ap-
proximately three weeks later supported Pataki's decision to
transfer the responsibility of the preservation of the waterfront
out of the hands of the Commission. 175 Lawrence Brooks, the au-
thor of this editorial, considered the Horizons Waterfront "a well-
intentioned experiment that wasn't too successful and deserve[d]
to be ended."' 76 His attendance at the Horizons Waterfront meet-
ings revealed that the Commission was not planning to enhance
the waterfront for the residents of the communities but to create a
"tourist trap."177 The members of the community had voiced sug-
gestions regarding the development of the waterfront and how
they felt it should be designed.17 8 A month after the announce-
ment that Horizons Waterfront was being dissolved, however, an-
other concerned citizen voiced his opinion on the editorial page.17 9
This citizen felt that the Commission deserved a chance because
solid plans "have emerged ... for what should be done with the
waterfront, a neglected community asset. 180 This person's view
of how the Commission handled community suggestions, making
171. See Jon R. Sorensen, Pataki to Scrap Horizons Panel New Development Office
will Handle Waterfront, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 3, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL
5449994.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 1.
175. See Lawrence M. Brooks, Horizons Panel Didn't Do Its Job, Deserves to be
Terminated, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 28, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 5460928.
176. Id. at 1.
177. "Instead we [the residents of the participating communities] get plans for a
tourist trap that will cost a family of four $50 for an afternoon (if they don't stop at the
obligatory cafeteria and gift shop) and one for which they'll have to pay to park." Id.
at 2.
178. The article states that citizens in attendance at the meetings repeatedly re-
quested free parking and footpaths by the water. See Lawrence M. Brooks, Horizons
Panel Didn't Do Its Job, Deserves to be Terminated, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 28, 1995, at 2,
available in 1995 WL 5460928.
179. See Editorial, Who Will Save Horizons? Regional Waterfront Agency Deserves
Survival, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 8, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5467853.
180. See id. at 2.
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"public access to the water's edge a guiding priority,"18 1 is con-
trary to the opinion expressed by Lawrence Brooks.18 2 Regardless
of the views expressed by concerned citizens, Horizons Waterfront
ceased to exist at the urging of Governor Pataki, almost seven
years after the parties drafted the agreement.
F. Smithtown
In 1989, an "Integrated Municipal Review of Actions Located
within Coastal Area Law" (hereinafter "Smithtown")18 3 was en-
tered into between the Town of Smithtown, and the Villages of
Head of the Harbor and Nissequoque. 8 4 This agreement in-
tended to "foster a cooperative relationship between [the partici-
pating municipalities] to provide for coordinated review and
efforts of actions located within the coastal areas so that they
could advance policies, standards, and conditions of their respec-
tive Local Waterfront Revitalization Programs. 18 5 This agree-
ment differs from the KYC agreement in that it provided for
"integrated review of actions." 8 6 The town and villages enacted
the local law 8 7 to preserve and maintain the waterfront areas in-
fringing on their borders. 88 The cooperation aspect of the agree-
ment arose when one of the participating municipalities proposed
an action.' 8 9 The agreement outlined specific steps to be taken by
both the proposing and reviewing municipalities. 90 The steps to
be taken by the proposing municipality include:
1. a full description of the nature and location of the action;
2. stipulation of dates and times of hearings, meetings, and
review and comment periods;
3. exchange of coastal assessment forms, environment as-
sessment forms including copies of applications and supportive
documentation;
181. See id.
182. See Brooks, supra note 175.
183. See Integrated Municipal Review of Actions Located within Coastal Area Law
(June 1989) [hereinafter Smithtown] (on file with the author).
184. See id.
185. Id. at 1.
186. Id.
187. See SMITHTOWN, N.Y., LocAL LAW ch. 52 (1978).
188. See Smithtown, supra note 183.
189. See Smithtown, supra note 183, at 2.
190. See Smithtown, supra note 183.
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4. time limitation - as early in the planning stages as pos-
sible or in the alternative at least thirty days prior to the re-
viewing municipality's decision on the action. 191
This notification enabled the reviewing board to determine if
the proposed action was in the best interest of the communities
and to determine if the action would directly conflict with any ex-
isting policies or standards in the LWRP. 192 The Smithtown
agreement acts more like a check and balance system on neighbor-
ing communities, rather than a direct cooperative effect among
them.
Since this agreement was also enacted prior to the 1992 stat-
utes,193 the backbone of the agreement differs from those created
today. Home Rule permitted municipalities to govern themselves
as they saw fit within their own boundaries. 194 In this agreement,
the communities regulate the independent activities of the com-
munities, but do not cooperatively plan how the waterfront should
be preserved and maintained. 195 This is an example of the poten-
tial for confusion in the communities; they have the right to exer-
cise Home Rule, yet at the same time the area to be preserved
extends beyond that power. In order to remedy the potential con-
flicting regulations of the waterfront, these three communities de-
cided to review the proposed action in an objective manner. 96
The communities did not create a new entity exclusively for the
LWRP; instead, they retained their own respective boards, which
reviewed the proposed actions originating in the other
communities. 197
G. DeKalb - Richville Site Plan Review Law
In 1991, the Town of DeKalb and the Village of Richville
passed a "Site Plan Review Law" (hereinafter "DeKalb-
Richville"),198 consolidating their two planning boards into one co-
191. See Smithtown, supra note 183, at 2.
192. See Smithtown, supra note 183, at 3.
193. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. TowN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); and N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
194. See Interview with John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace University School
of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 1999).
195. See Smithtown, supra note 183.
196. See Smithtown, supra note 183, at 4.
197. See Smithtown, supra note 183, at 3.
198. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 88.
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operative board1 99 to review applications applicable to both the
Town and the Village.200 This agreement differs from the previ-
ously enacted agreements in that the Town of DeKalb incorpo-
rated this joint venture between itself and the Village of Richville
into its local law. 20 1 The law is extensively detailed in terms of
the requirements, functions, and specifications of the planning
board, 20 2 including: how the scope of permissible authority is
granted to the board,203 when a site plan should be considered ex-
pired,20 4 and the selection and term duration of the planning
board members. 20 5
IV. Intermunicipal Agreements Enacted Between 1992 and
1993
Following the enactment of the 1992 statutes, 20 6 which codi-
fied and refined existing practices of municipalities, local legisla-
tures began to understand that cooperation is required in order to
preserve vital natural resources and areas of interest.20 7 Munici-
palities began to see the impacts of the ability to self-regulate.
While Home Rule authority was sufficient to permit each commu-
nity to regulate as it deemed appropriate, there were areas that
needed preservation and attention extending beyond the individ-
ual community borders. The need for cohesion in the preservation
of historic districts and environmentally significant areas gave
rise to the increased use of intermunicipal agreements to address
and accommodate those growing concerns.
A. Mianus River Watershed Resolution
In 1992, the towns of Bedford, Greenwich, North Castle,
Pound Ridge, and Stamford entered into the "Mianus River Wa-
199. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 88, at 43.
200. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 88, at 44.
201. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 88, at 1.
202. The law is divided into seven articles; (1) General Provisions, (2) Applicability,
(3) Procedure, (4) Public Hearing and Planning Board Decision, (5) Review Standards,
(6) Administration, (7) Miscellaneous Provisions. See id.
203. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 88, at 44.
204. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 88, at 48.
205. See Delkalb-Richville, supra note 88, at 43.
206. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); see N.Y. ToWN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); see N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); and see N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
207. See Interview with John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace University School
of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 1999).
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tershed Resolution" (hereinafter "Mianus River").208 The purpose
of this agreement was the promotion of bioregional watershed pro-
tection. 20 9 This agreement demonstrates the same incentive uti-
lized in the KYC IMA 210 almost eight years before, but the
originality of this agreement was not as stark as that of KYC. 211
This agreement was entered into at a time when the awareness of
the importance of the environmental resources was well estab-
lished. 212 There is some uniqueness, however, encompassed in
this agreement in that the participating municipalities were from
different states; Greenwich and Stamford in Connecticut and Bed-
ford, North Castle and Pound Ridge in New York.213 By crossing
state lines, these towns demonstrated that the need for multi-gov-
ernmental cooperation extends beyond those neighboring commu-
nities within the same state. Although this particular agreement
set forth in detail the reasons behind the creation of the agree-
ment,21 4 the procedures used to accomplish the preservation of the
Mianus River are markedly absent.215 The agreement does not
provide for an amendment procedure or for standards to be set at
a later date.
B. Dunkirk and Fredonia Water Services Agreement
The topic of the 1993 agreement between the Village of
Fredonia and the City of Dunkirk was the sharing of a public
water supply.216 In the "Contract Between City of Dunkirk and
Village of Fredonia Water Services" (hereinafter "Dunkirk-
Fredonia"), 21 7 the City expanded its public water supply to serve
the Village. 218 In exchange for the water, the Village provided
and maintained the necessary equipment to access the water from
the City's supply.219 The agreement had a term of five years 220
208. See Mianus River, supra note 86.
209. See Mianus River, supra note 86, at 2.
210. See KYC, supra Part III.D.
211. See KYC, supra Part III.D.
212. See Interview with John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace University School
of Law, in White Plains, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 1999).
213. See Mianus River, supra note 86.
214. See Mianus River, supra note 86, at 1.
215. This agreement lists ten reasons for the creation of the agreement yet there is
nothing to indicate a plan of action as to the preservation of this area. See id. at 2.
216. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
217. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
218. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
219. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94, at 2-3.
220. The agreement began on January 1, 1993 and terminated on December 31,
1997. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94, at 2.
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with the opportunity for renewal for another five-year block so
long as both parties consented to the renewal of the terms of ser-
vice. 221 While the subject of the agreement appears to be simple
in nature, the parties created a detailed agreement, including
thirty-five separate clauses 22 2 and topics previously absent from
intermunicipal agreements.223 Interestingly, it includes sections
addressing indemnification, violations, and nonsignificant viola-
tions. 224 Section Seventeen of Dunkirk-Fredonia sets out the in-
demnification agreement as follows:
1. The Village shall save harmless and indemnify and de-
fend the City from any claims, suits, damages or causes of action
arising or resulting from the Village's negligent use of the City
water filtration facilities.
2. The City shall not be responsible for, or liable for, failure
to provide adequate water filtration facilities or services, pro-
vided such failure is permitted by this contract.
3. The City shall save harmless and indemnify and defend
the Village from any claims, suits, damages or causes of action
arising, or resulting, from the City's negligence with respect to
the conveyance of water to the Village. 225
The drafters of this agreement considered many possibilities
and instances in an effort to make the agreement as comprehen-
sive as was practicable, and in an effort to prevent situations aris-
ing from the project not addressed in the agreement.226
C. Forestville-Chautauqua Water Resource Development
The Village of Forestville sought out the services of the Chau-
tauqua County Department of Health Division of Environmental
221. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94, at 1.
222. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
223. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
224. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94. Section Twenty-One covers "Non-
significant Violations." It specifies what these violations are and how the parties
shall deal with them:
1. A nonsignificant violation by the Village of the City water use legisla-
tion shall not be grounds for termination of this contract. The City recog-
nizes that nonsignificant violations may occur.
2. Nonsignificant violation means a violation, which does not interfere
with the water filtration plant operation or process or create any hazard.
3. The Village shall take all necessary measures to correct any such
violation.
Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94, at 9.
225. Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94, at 7.
226. See generally Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
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Services in 1992, to evaluate the quality and the quantity of the
Village's water supply.227 This intermunicipal agreement, enti-
tled "Vater Resource Development" (hereinafter "Forestville-
Chautauqua")228 allowed the Village to utilize the County's serv-
ices that were beyond the scope of the Village's resources. 229 The
Village and the County agreed that the County would provide
services including: stream gauging,230 investigation of springs,231
and drill piezometers 232 for the collection of data pertinent to the
evaluation of problems in the Village's water supply.233 The Vil-
lage monetarily compensated the County for its services during
the four-month duration of the agreement.234
D. Nunda Joint Planning Board and Joint Zoning Board of
Appeals
Similar to the 1991 agreement between the Town of DeKalb
and the Village of Richville,235 the Town of Nunda and the Village
of Nunda (hereinafter "Nunda") drafted a local law agreeing to the
creation of a joint planning board and a joint zoning board of ap-
peals.236 The specifications drafted in this agreement are similar
in nature to those found in the Town of DeKalb and the Village of
Richville, 237 regarding how the members were appointed, which
municipalities chose the members, the term of the membership,
and the steps taken to occupy a vacancy. 238 Provision Two grants
removal power to the Town of Nunda for those members ap-
pointed by the town. 239
227. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84.
228. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84.
229. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84.
230. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84, at 1-2.
231. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84, at 2.
232. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84.
233. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84, at 1.
234. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84, at 2.
235. See DeKalb-Richville, supra Part III.G.
236. See Nunda, supra note 23, at 1 (authorizing the creation of "a joint Zoning
Board of Appeals with the Village of Nunda") (1993) and Local Law No. 2 for the
Town of Nunda (authorizing the creation of "a joint Planning Board with the Village
of Nunda") See id.
237. See DeKalb-Richville, supra Part III.G.
238. See Nunda, supra note 23, at 2.
239. See Nunda, supra note 23, at 7.
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V. Intermunicipal Agreements Enacted From 1994 to the
present
A. Castile-Perry
Responding to the need for the preservation of natural re-
sources and open space, the Town of Castile, the Village of Castile
and the Village of Perry created an amendment to "Local Law No.
1 of the Year 1970 Zoning Regulations" (hereinafter "Castile-
Perry").240 The communities agreed to draft amendments to their
current zoning regulations for the protection of agricultural uses,
the preservation of open spaces, and the prevention of inordinate
concentration of population within the communities. 24 1
B. Historic River Towns of Westchester Intermunicipal
Agreement
The Historic River Towns of Westchester County, New York
Intermunicipal Agreement (hereinafter "Historic River Towns")242
was designed to protect a specific area of interest.243 In 1994, ten
municipalities entered into a cooperative agreement to preserve
the river towns located in that area.244 The motivating factor for
the creation of the Historic River Towns of Westchester In-
termunicipal Agreement was economic in nature.245 The commu-
nities began to feel the aftereffects of the economic recession
including the corporate merger of General Foods and Philip Mor-
ris,246 the downsizing of IBM,247 and the closing of the General
Motors plant.2 48 The purpose of the agreement focused on ways to
increase tourism and economic enhancement to the Lower Hudson
Valley Area (LHVA).249 This intermunicipal agreement lists seven
goals to be accomplished by the creation of the Historic River
Towns:
240. See A Local Law Amending Local Law No. 1 of the year 1970 Zoning Regula-
tions (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter Castile-Perry] (on file with the author).
241. See id. at 1-2.
242. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
243. The signatories were the mayors of the Villages of Croton-on-Hudson, Ossin-
ing, North Tarrytown, Tarrytown; the supervisors of the towns of Ossining and Cor-
tlandt, the city manager of Peekskill, the president of Historic Hudson Valley, the
village manager of Hastings-on-Hudson, and the administrator of the village of Ir-
vington. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 5.
244. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
245. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
246. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 1.
247. See id. Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 2.
248. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 2.
249. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 3.
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(a) To promote intermunicipal cooperation by and between
the signatories 250 to this agreement.
(b) To build the local economy of the Lower Hudson Valley
area through public-private partnership.
(c) To enhance and promote tourism in the Lower Hudson
Valley area.
(d) To increase public awareness of features and benefits of
local destinations.
(e) To improve methods of transportation to tourist sites in
the Lower Hudson Valley area.
(f) To develop a comprehensive marketing plan for the tour-
ist sites and the communities wherein they are located in the
Lower Hudson Valley area.
(g) To recommend improvement of... tourist sites .... 251
This agreement, in contrast to the Smithtown 252 agreement,
encourages the municipalities to work as a cohesive unit to
achieve an underlying common goal, namely the preservation of
the river towns in an effort to increase economic gains through
tourism. 253 By utilizing their newfound power under the 1992
statutes, 254 the communities collaborated to create an overlay dis-
trict for the Historic River Towns.255 All of these communities
could have regulated their own riverfront areas separately, how-
ever by joining forces the revenue granted to the group will be
greater than the sum of its parts. The IMA also permits the com-
munities to determine the best way to achieve the common goal of
attracting people to come to their areas. By working as a unit,
these communities can formulate numerous different strategies
for the promotion of tourism. These ideas will eventually boil
down to a select few that will be the most efficient and most likely
to produce the desired results. This agreement was conceived only
two years after the enactment of the statutes,256 when the formula
for the intermunicipal agreement was far from perfected. The
250. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
251. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 3-4.
252. See Smithtown, supra note 183.
253. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
254. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. ToWN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); and N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
255. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 4.
256. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. ToWN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741 (McKinney
1995); N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
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Historic River Towns designated an already existing entity to act
as trustee of the finances generated for the project.257 Later
agreements have created entities exclusively for the management
of funds raised for the underlying project. 258 This concerted effort
by the participating municipalities was an early stab at the appli-
cation of the new statutes.
C. Manhasset Bay
The following year, 1995, twelve municipalities 259 drafted an
intermunicipal agreement (hereinafter "Manhasset Bay") to pre-
serve Manhasset Bay. 260 The communities recognized this area
"as a vital coastal ecosystem essential to the environment and eco-
nomic well-being of the people in the surrounding communi-
ties."261 The conservation of Manhasset Bay as a "healthy and
diverse marine ecosystem" 262 and a commercial and recreational
region serves as the foundation for this intermunicipal agree-
ment.263 The communities became concerned about the status of
Manhasset Bay as a result of pollution.264 The collective body
knew that something had to be done to safeguard the Bay from
further degradation. 265 The agreement identifies some of the
sources of pollution as "stormwater runoff, petroleum spills, in-
dustrial effluent, illegal dumping, floatable debris, and boat
waste."
2 66
The identification of the root of the problem lends itself to the
next step required for the preservation of natural resources: how
municipalities will curtail or prevent this behavior so as to reverse
the existing damage and prevent similar damage in the future.
The goals of this agreement focus primarily on the preservation of
fishing and the protection of the surrounding tidal wetlands. 267
This committee had the responsibility of reviewing and assessing
257. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 4.
258. See, e.g., L.I. Sound, supra note 6; Irondequoit, supra note 6.
259. The County of Nassau, the Town of North Hempstead, and the Villages of
Baxter Estates, Manorhaven, Port Washington North, Plandome, Plandome Heights,
Great Neck, Thomaston, Kensington, Kings Point and Sands Point entered the Man-
hasset Bay Grant. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
260. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86, at 2.
261. Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
262. Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
263. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
264. Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
265. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
266. Manhasset Bay, supra note 86, at 2.
267. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
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the water quality as well as the wildlife habits in and around the
Bay area.268 The committee was also required to draft solutions to
existing problems and to create measures to prevent repeated
problems in the future.269 This agreement specifically designates
goals for this committee, which involve the ecosystemic health of
the Bay and surrounding tidal wetlands. 270 The Manhasset Bay
Grant seeks to preserve a natural resource.27 1 The conservation
of this ecosystem must be a concerted effort on the parts of the
communities holding land in and around the Bay.
The Manhasset Bay agreement demonstrates with extreme
clarity the need for intermunicipal agreements. The area needing
protection consists of a body of water and the surrounding land.
In order for the preservation to be successful, all of the communi-
ties must be willing to participate in the maintenance and conser-
vation of Manhasset Bay. What if one community decided to
regulate its area of the Bay under its Home Rule authority and
left the others to collectively agree on methods best suited for con-
servation? The time and expense of the committee comprised of
the numerous municipalities may be for naught if the Home Rule
municipality chooses to act in direct conflict with the committee.
The unique qualities of a waterway require uniformity in its regu-
lation. What if the Home Rule municipality does not fine individ-
uals for illegal dumping, but the committee does? The impact of
the inconsistency seems small at first blush. Enforcement of the
regulation, however, would become tedious and not cost effective.
Short of catching the illegal dumper in the act, how could one
268. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
269. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
270. The goals of this committee are as follows:
improve the water quality of Manhasset Bay so that all waters of the Bay
will consistently meet water quality standards for bathing, swimming
and fishing;
improve the water quality of Manhasset Bay so that it will once again be
classified as an area suitable for the harvesting of shellfish for human
consumption; restore and enhance the surrounding tidal wetlands that
serve to cleanse ecosystems; provide marine food production and wildlife
habitat; offer opportunities for education, research and recreation; pro-
vide flood and storm control; and offer open space and aesthetic
appreciation;
control and reduce point and nonpoint source pollution affecting the Bay
and its environs; and
coordinate local coastal regulations so as to maximize protection and en-
hancement efforts to improve the quality of Manhasset Bay, its tributa-
ries and wetlands.
See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86, at 3.
271. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
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prove that the dumping occurred within the area regulated by the
committee and not the Home Rule community? Furthermore, the
currents of the waterways would defeat the goal set forth by the
committee. The Home Rule municipality continues to permit ille-
gal dumping and the current takes the debris and chemicals to the
communities participating in the committee defeating the purpose
of the committee. This example might seem improbable, but it il-
lustrates the necessity of collaboration by municipalities when the
underlying goal is the preservation of natural resources.
D. Titicus River
In 1995, the Towns of Lewisboro and North Salem in the
State of New York and the Town of Ridgefield in Connecticut col-
laborated with New York City for the preservation and protection
of the Titicus River Watershed (hereinafter "Titicus River"). 272
The communities desired increased water quality for the drinking
water provided to New York City from the Titicus River.273 This
agreement provided a unique section regarding written state-
ments released to the press, 274 providing that New York City
would be given five days' notice of any release.27 5 It also provided
that New York City would have a thirty-day time period to review
and comment on "publications, reports, and other written state-
ments."276 This agreement further set forth the responsibilities of
the participating parties regarding liability, indemnification, and
the renewal of the agreement. 277
E. Intermunicipal Agreement Irondequoit Bay Management
Project
In 1997, the Department of Environmental Conservation
(DEC) signed on to an intermunicipal agreement.278 The Ironde-
quoit Bay Management Project (hereinafter "Irondequoit Bay")279
combined the forces of the Monroe County, the Towns of Ironde-
quoit, Penfield, and Webster, and the New York State Department
272. See Titicus River Watershed (July 1995) [hereinafter Titicus River] (on file
with the author).
273. See Titicus River, supra note 272.
274. See Titicus River, supra note 272, at 4.
275. See Titicus River, supra note 272.
276. See Titicus River, supra note 272, at 4.
277. See Titicus River, supra note 272, at 2,5.
278. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6.
279. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6.
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of Environmental Conservation. 2 0 The agreement sets forth two
separate goals of the Irondequoit Bay Coordinating Committee
(hereinafter "IBCC"): to "[d]efine the purpose of the IBCC based
on major issues or projects"281 and to "[i]mprove the effectiveness
of the IBCC."28 2 There are seven purposes of the creation of the
IBCC: (1) the development of a consistent vision for the Ironde-
quoit Bay, (2) the minimization of conflicts between stakeholders
in the IBCC, (3) the advocating of consistency among town codes
and plans, (4) the bolstering of proactive resource management,
(5) the education and enlightenment of the stakeholders as to the
vision of the IBCC, (6) the identification of impacts on the Bay
area and continual resource appraisal, and (7) the elevated acces-
sibility to the Bay area by the public. 283 The methods for im-
proved effectiveness of the IBCC include an effective review
process, technical staff and assistance, efficiency of communica-
tions with participating agencies, increased credibility for the
IBCC, and community feedback. 28 4 The DEC has three specific
responsibilities within the IBCC, 285 two of which illustrate the
need for cooperation from state agencies for the preservation of
natural resources. 286 The DEC is responsible for educating com-
mittee members about "air, water and soil quality and fish and
wildlife resources,"28 7 as well as State Environmental Quality Re-
view28 8 (SEQR) regulations. 289 The DEC will play an important
role in this intermunicipal agreement by conveying information to
the communities participating in the agreement, enabling them to
create an efficient preservation of the Bay area and conserve the
resources in a manner consistent with the regulations set forth by
the DEC.
280. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6.
281. Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6, at 2.
282. Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6.
283. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6, Article II.
284. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6, Article III.
285. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6, at 3.
286. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6, at 3.
287. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6, at 3.
288. "The State Environmental Quality Review Act requires local legislatures and
land use agencies to consider, avoid, and mitigate significant environmental impacts
of the projects that they approve, the plans or regulations they adopt, and the projects
they undertake directly." JOHN NOLON, WELL GROUNDED 445 (1st ed. 1998).
289. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6, at 3.
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F. Long Island Sound Watershed Intermunicipal Council
Intermunicipal Agreement
An intermunicipal agreement for the preservation of a water-
shed was drafted in 1998.290 Eleven communities joined together
under the Long Island Sound Watershed Intermunicipal Council
(hereinafter "L. I. Sound")291 to preserve and conserve the Long
Island Sound.292 This committee was interested in cleaning up
the Long Island Sound and the surrounding area.293 The goals set
for this agreement are as follows:
(1) a cleaner Long Island Sound,
(2) the responsibility of protecting the Sound and the bene-
fits of that protection,
(3) curtailment of point and nonpoint source pollution,
(4) decreasing existing pollution, and
(5) preserving the open space and natural resources in and
around the Sound.294
The agreement also delineates shared interests among the
communities including the increased economic value of the busi-
ness and industrial districts, 295 improvement of air and water
quality,296 reduction of noise and traffic, 297 open space and recrea-
tional opportunities, 298 and the "cultural, social, scenic, aesthetic,
and historical assets of the area."299 The results to be achieved by
this committee include obtaining funding from county, state, and
federal agencies, 300 and working with these agencies to create an
intermunicipal agreement that is consistent with the plans and
programs of the participating municipalities.30 1 The underlying
goal is the improvement of the quality of life for individuals resid-
290. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
291. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
292. The communities in this agreement are the Cities of Mount Vernon, New
Rochelle and Rye, the Town of Mamaroneck, the Town-Villages of Harrison and Scar-
sdale and the Villages of Larchmont, Mamaroneck, Pelham Manor, Port Chester and
Rye Brook. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
293. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
294. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 1.
295. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 1.
296. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 1.
297. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 1.
298. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
299. L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 1.
300. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 2.
301. L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
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ing in these communities. 30 2 The preservation of the Sound and
the area surrounding it will also increase the economic well-being
of these communities, 30 3 as well as the conservation of the area for
wildlife. 30 4
VI. Comparison of Intermunicipal Agreements from Three
Separate Categories: Pre-1992, 1992-93, and Post
1994
A. Common Themes
The majority of the intermunicipal agreements share stan-
dard clauses or provisions. There are specific provisions that
should be included in every agreement and some that are optional.
The Department of the State of New York created the "James A.
Coon Local Government Technical Series" (hereinafter "Coon
Technical")305 to assist local governments in various areas of the
law. One of the issues addressed in this series is "Intergovern-
mental Cooperation." 30 6 This document has a section entitled "Il-
lustrative Contract Clauses" 30 7 which gives examples of clauses
common to intermunicipal agreements. The categories are: intro-
ductory clauses, parties, rationale, statutory authority, services
provided or jointly performed, financial arrangements, and indem-
nification.308 The style and inclusion of clauses and provisions can
vary greatly from agreement to agreement. For example, Nunda
Planning 30 9 is only one page in length whereas Dunkirk-
Fredonia 310 is fifteen pages long. The amount of detail and prepa-
ration that municipalities put into their agreements is a matter of
preference. Some clauses could be considered "boilerplate" or com-
mon to all intermunicipal agreements.
302. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 1
303. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
304. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 1.
305. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF STATE, JAMES A. COON LOCAL GOVERNMENT TECH-
NICAL SERIES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION (1998).
306. Id. at 1.
307. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF STATE, JAMES A. COON LOCAL GOVERNMENT TECH-
NICAL SERIES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 7 (1998).
308. See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF STATE, JAMES A. COON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TECHNICAL SERIES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 8-12 (1998).
309. See Nunda, supra note 23.
310. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
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1. Standard Introduction Clauses
The Coon Technical311 provides that agreements should begin
with "whereas clauses which identify the parties, the rationale for
entering into the agreement, the problem and its proposed solu-
tion, and the statute under which the particular type of agreement
is authorized."312 Each of these topics must be included in an in-
termunicipal agreement in order for it to be an effective document.
Omission of one of these elements will render the agreement
confusing and difficult to understand. To draft a comprehensive,
understandable agreement, municipalities must include introduc-
tory clauses giving the reader and the participants a clear, concise
understanding of the parties involved, the purposes of the agree-
ment, and the authority for the agreement.
2. Participating Parties
The first requirement of the introductory clauses is to specify
which parties will be participating in the agreement. All of the
agreements discussed in this comment list the municipalities col-
laborating in the agreement, with the exception of the Tug Hill
agreement.313 That agreement allows for the addition of other
municipalities through its amendment process. 314 The partici-
pants could potentially vary depending on the interest demon-
strated by municipalities not originally included in the
agreement.31 5 This agreement specifically sets forth which munic-
ipalities are participating and the end of the document where the
representatives sign on to the agreement.316
3. The Purpose Underlying the Agreement
The municipalities entering into an intermunicipal agree-
ment should clearly state the "reason for which the agreement is
entered into or the problem which the agreement hopes to
solve."31 7 Intermunicipal agreements can be created for almost
any underlying purpose. The agreements considered in this com-
311. See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF STATE, JAMES A. COON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TECHNICAL SERIES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION (1998).
312. Id. at 8.
313. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
314. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
315. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
316. See Tug Hill, supra note 113, at 3.
317. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF STATE, JAMES A. COON LOCAL GOVERNMENT TECH-
NICAL SERIES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 8 (1998).
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ment range from a shared planning board318 to the protection of
the entire Long Island Sound.319 An example of a purpose clause
is found in the Dunkirk-Fredonia agreement: "the City is an
owner of a water filtration plant and water system and has a sup-
ply of water in excess of its public utility service obligations and is
willing to sell a portion of such excess water supply to the Vil-
lage."320 A more simplistic clause can be found in the L.I. Sound
agreement.32' The goal established by the participating munici-
palities was "a cleaner Long Island Sound and.., the protect[ion
ofl the watershed of Long Island Sound."322 Sometimes when the
purpose is obvious, the municipalities exclude this section alto-
gether. In the Nunda 323 and Lowville3 24 agreements, the munici-
palities consolidate their planning boards and zoning boards of
appeals. None of these agreements includes a purpose section;32
5
perhaps the consolidation of the boards is the only purpose they
intend to achieve. They could have included financial reasons or
convenience as an underlying purpose, but they chose to omit this
section entirely.
The Historic River Towns, 326 Manhasset Bay327 and Mianus
River3 28 agreements describe the background for the creation of
the agreement. In Historic River Towns, the closing of plants in
the area decreased the economic returns from the nearby commu-
nities. 329 They decided, therefore, in an effort to recover from the
financial hardship created by the closing of the local plants, to re-
vitalize the waterfront to attract tourism and in turn economic
gain. 330 In Manhasset Bay, the purpose of the agreement was the
preservation of the Bay "as a vital coastal ecosystem essential to
the environmental and economic well being of the people in the
surrounding communities and a Center of Historic Maritime Ac-
tivity."331 The agreement further describes specific problems
318. See Nunda, supra note 23.
319. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
320. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 93, at 1.
321. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
322. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 1.
323. See Nunda, supra note 23.
324. See Lowville Planning, supra note 23.
325. See generally Nunda, supra note 23; Lowville Planning, supra note 23.
326. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
327. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
328. See Mianus River, supra note 88.
329. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
330. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
331. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
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faced in that area 332 and interests to be protected. 333 The Mianus
River 334 agreement had similar objectives to those of Manhasset
Bay.335 The preservation of the river as the "sole source of drink-
ing water"336 was the primary concern. This agreement also de-
tails extensively what is to be protected and how those goals are to
be achieved. 337
The purpose of the agreement may be as elaborate or simple
as the parties choose to make it. What they are trying to achieve
through the intermunicipal agreement may dictate the length and
detail of the purpose section of the agreement. This section details
why the agreement is being created and how the end shall be
attained.
4. Delegation of Authority
Some variation occurs as to how each group of municipalities
approaches different topics. One of the predominant concerns
when drafting an intermunicipal agreement is the delegation of
responsibility for the actions to be achieved through the agree-
ment. 338 Coon Technical provides that "[p]lanned services should
be set forth as specifically as possible so that each of the parties is
fully aware of its duties and responsibilities under the
agreement."339
5. Entities Created Within an Intermunicipal Agreement
Some agreements include a provision for the creation of a new
entity. For example, Tug Hill, 34 0 KYC,341 Horizons Waterfront,342
DeKalb, 34 3 Historic River Towns,344 Manhasset Bay,3 4 5 and L.I.
332. Some of the problems include; petroleum spills, illegal dumping and boat
waste. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
333. Interests to be protected include; water quality, wildlife habitats, and en-
hancement of the quality of the wetlands. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
334. See Mianus River, supra note 88.
335. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
336. See Mianus River, supra note 88, at 1.
337. See Mianus River, supra note 88, at 1.
338. See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF STATE, JAMES A. COON LocAL GOVERNMENT
TEcHNIcAL SERIES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 9 (1998) ("Services provided or
jointly performed").
339. Id.
340. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
341. See KYC, supra note 86.
342. See Horizons Waterfront, supra note 162.
343. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 88.
344. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
345. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
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Sound346 all created a board or committee to be responsible for the
execution of objectives underlying the intermunicipal agreement.
The separate entities created by each of these agreements are as
different as the primary reasons for the drafting of the agree-
ments. The Tug Hill Planning Board consisted of "two individual
members from each municipality appointed by the appropriate
town board."347 The KYC 348 agreement reflects the membership
appointment set out in Tug Hill.349 The members of both the Tug
Hill Planning Board and the KYC Board elected its own of-
ficers.350 L.I. Sound351 decided to compose its "Long Island Sound
Watershed Intermunicipal Council" (hereinafter "Council")352 in
the same manner set forth in the Tug Hill 353 and KYC354 agree-
ments.3 55 However, the L.I. Sound agreement does not provide
the Council with the authority to appoint its own officers. 356
In contrast, the Horizons Waterfront 357 designed a Commis-
sion consisting of fifteen voting members, 358 and an eighteen
member non-voting group of members including "representatives
from the economic development agencies from each of the parties,
and other County-wide public agencies, business groups, and cer-
tain state agencies."359 The Horizons Waterfront permits people
who are not directly involved in the participating municipalities to
make contributions to the objectives and procedures encompassed
in the agreement. 360 However, the members not elected from
within the municipalities are not permitted to vote on the issues
to be passed by the Commission. 361 This panel of representatives
346. See L.I. Sound Watershed, supra note 6.
347. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
348. See KYC, supra note 86.
349. The KYC Board was "comprised of two individual members from each town
appointed by the respective Town Board, and one County representative to be ap-
pointed by the Orleans County Legislature." KYC, supra note 86, at 1; see also Tug
Hill, supra note 113, at 1.
350. See Tug Hill, supra note 113, at 1; see also KYC, supra note 86, at 1.
351. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
352. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
353. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
354. See KYC, supra note 86.
355. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6, at 2.
356. See L.I. Sound, supra note 6.
357. See Horizons Waterfront, supra note 163.
358. See supra note 168.
359. See Horizons Waterfront, supra note 163, at 2.
360. See Horizons Waterfront, supra note 163.
361. See Horizons Waterfront, supra note 163.
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remains at a set number and is not determined by the number of
municipalities participating in the agreement.
A third potential approach for the appointment of members
on an entity created within the power of the intermunicipal agree-
ment is demonstrated in the Manhasset Bay362 and Historic River
Town 363 agreements. These committees permitted each of the
signatories to appoint one member to the committee3 64 and
board.365 The size of the committees depends on the number of
participating municipalities. These committees have the potential
to be smaller than those previously mentioned requiring two
member appointments per participant. 366 The reasoning behind
the allocation of members to municipalities stems from the fact
that each community will be equally represented and the commit-
tee will not be controlled or overpowered by a dominant
municipality.
A final approach, used by DeKalb-Richville, 367 allows munici-
palities to determine a small set number of members to be ap-
pointed to the board. 368 In this agreement, three members of the
board must reside in the Town of DeKalb and two must reside in
the Village of Richville. 369 The five member board serves stag-
gered terms, the three DeKalb members serve one, three and five
year terms whereas the two Richville members serve two and four
years.370 By allowing the Richville members to serve longer terms
than the first two DeKalb representatives, the agreement compen-
sates for the additional member provided to DeKalb. The Plan-
ning Board created by the DeKalb-Richville agreement is required
to have an uneven number of members to avoid an even split in
the voting processes. Since there are only two participants in this
agreement, one of them had to sacrifice a member on the board in
362. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
363. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
364. "The town and each of the twelve separate municipalities shall appoint one
representative to the Manhasset Bay Protection Committee." See Manhasset Bay,
supra note 86, at 3.
365. "A representative of each signatory of this agreement shall constitute the
Board." See Historic River Towns, supra note 73, at 2.
366. See, e.g., L.I. Sound, supra note 6; KYC, supra note 86.
367. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 87.
368. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 87.
369. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 87.
370. See DeKalb-Richville, supra note 87.
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order to conform to the standards required for planning boards in
New York State. 7 1
The ability of the municipalities to determine who should be
responsible for executing the objectives of the agreement is an im-
portant element that should be included in each intermunicipal
agreement. By omitting this provision, the intermunicipal agree-
ment may be implemented in an inefficient and ineffective man-
ner, defeating the attractiveness of cooperation among the
communities. Without this provision, the municipalities may be
unsure as to what role they are required to play. Further, without
the "delegation of authority" clause, municipalities may unknow-
ingly duplicate required measures and omit others entirely, in ef-
fect defeating the primary purpose of the intermunicipal
agreement.
6. Responsibility Vested in Already Existing Entities
The parties to the Irondequoit Bay agreement used a commit-
tee already established to oversee the objectives of the agree-
ment.372 The municipalities agreed to the continued use of "the
Irondequoit Bay Coordinating Committee as an advisory commit-
tee whose mission is to coordinate, among the various levels of
government... all levels of public and private use of the area, and
to develop, recommend and monitor, related policies."373 Other
municipalities merely appointed one of the participants, or a col-
lective group of the participants, as the body responsible for the
execution of the agreements. In Dunkirk-Fredonia, 374 the parties
designated the responsibilities of the Village in a separate section
from that which specified the responsibilities of the City.3 7 5 There
was no need for the creation of a separate entity because the City
agreed to provide services to the Village in return for compensa-
tion.37 6 The Forestville-Chatauqua 377 agreement is substantially
similar to the Dunkirk-Fredonia 378 agreement in that both stipu-
lated that the County would provide services to the Village in ex-
371. "Planning Boards must consist of five to seven members." MARY E. MOHNACH
& KATHRYN M. RYAN, WELL GROUNDED DESKBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND PLANNERs 118
(1st ed. 1998).
372. See Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6.
373. Irondequoit Bay, supra note 6, at 1.
374. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
375. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
376. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
377. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84.
378. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
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change for monetary compensation. 379 Other communities have
combined the resources of participating municipalities into a col-
lective body for the purposes of the agreement. For example,
Titicus River collectively refers to the participating towns as the
"Cooperative."38 0 The Flint Creek agreement also clumped the
participating counties into a collective group called "Sponsoring
Local Organization." 38 1 The Nunda Planning38 2 and Nunda
ZBA 313 merely designated the Town as the party responsible for
the execution of the agreement.38 4
7. Contribution of Funds
Each intermunicipal agreement requires some kind of finan-
cial support. Depending on what the agreement purports to ac-
complish, the funds will be allocated accordingly. The City
participant in Titicus River would not pay more than $9,975 in
furtherance of the agreement,3 5 and the Cooperative 38 6 would
contribute the remainder of the $17,453 required for the agree-
ment.38 7 The Flint Creek agreement 388 outlines in extensive de-
tail how the financing of the project was to be divided between the
Sponsoring Local Organization and the Service. 3 9 Only four
other agreements set forth the financial responsibilities of the mu-
nicipalities participating in the agreements. Manhasset Bay pro-
vides that the collective municipalities shall contribute
$70,000.390 The Historic River Towns municipalities were re-
quired to contribute $1,000 per year "to help with associated costs
of this group."391 The finance section of the KYC agreement 392
379. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84.
380. The municipalities referred to as the Cooperative are the Towns of Lewisboro,
North Salem, and Ridgefield. See Titicus River, supra note 272.
381. The Ontario County Board of Supervisors, Yates County Legislature, Ontario
County Soil and Water Conservation District, Yates County Soil and Water Conserva-
tion District, Steuben County Soil and Water Conservation District were the partici-
pants referred to as the Sponsoring Local Organization. See Flint Creek, supra note
92, at 1.
382. See Nunda, supra note 23.
383. See Nunda, supra note 23.
384. See Nunda, supra note 23.
385. See Titicus River, supra note 272.
386. See supra note 382.
387. See Titicus River, supra note 272, at 2.
388. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
389. See supra notes 110-111.
390. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
391. See Manhasset Bay, supra note 86.
392. See KYC, supra note 83.
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designates the fiscal agent, specifies the budget request deadline,
and provides that Orleans County will contribute forty percent of
the total cost of the project.393 The Tug Hill agreement provides
for the appointment of a fiscal agent and the submission of a
budget.394 If the budget of the project exceeded funding received
from grants, the municipalities were required to make contribu-
tions sufficient to cover the additional costs.395 The remaining in-
termunicipal agreements do not outline where or how the funding
for the projects will come from.396
B. Differences Among the Agreements
The agreements entered under the authority of the 1960 stat-
utes 397 differ from the later agreements in that their underlying
objectives and goals are much more simplistic. 398 The later agree-
ments show creativity and understanding of how powerful in-
termunicipal agreements can potentially become. The earlier
agreements sharing planning boards and zoning boards illustrate
the municipalities' reluctance to extend their authority beyond
their own borders. By reaching across municipal lines, the later
agreements demonstrate a heightened awareness of the need for
cohesiveness within the State of New York.399
Although the 1976 agreement for the protection of the Flint
Creek Watershed 400 included many boilerplate provisions, some
areas were lacking. The detail with which this agreement was
drafted does not allow the agreement to be effectively put into ac-
tion. The majority of the agreement provides for the acquisition of
land and the percentage of costs incurred by each of the parties. It
lacks a delegation of authority for decision-making processes aris-
ing in conjunction with the agreement. 401 Similarly, the Tug
Hill40 2 agreement entered into in 1981 was adequate on paper, but
when the municipalities put the theory to practice they realized
its problems. This agreement is unique because the municipali-
393. See KYC, supra note 86, at 2.
394. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
395. See Tug Hill, supra note 113.
396. See, e.g., Nunda, supra note 23; Lowville Planning supra note 23; DeKalb-
Richville, supra note 88.
397. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw §§ 119-o, 239-n (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
398. See, e.g., Nunda, supra note 23; Tug Hill, supra note 113.
399. See, e.g., L.I. Sound, supra note 6; Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
400. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
401. See Flint Creek, supra note 92.
402. See Tug Hill , supra note 113.
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ties amended the agreement ten years after its enactment to con-
form to the objectives the municipalities felt should be at the heart
of the agreement. By amending the original agreement, Tug Hill
fine-tuned the agreement to fit the needs of the communities
rather than trying to adjust the needs to the agreement.
Following the introduction of the 1992 statutes4 0 3 permitting
intermunicipal agreements with respect to land use issues, agree-
ments like Nunda Planning40 4 and Nunda ZBA 40 5 were still cling-
ing to the restrictive authority of the 1960 statutes.40 6 The
Mianus River 40 7 agreement tested the waters for the later agree-
ments conserving and preserving watersheds, wetlands, and other
land use concerns arising within the communities. The Dunkirk-
Fredonia 40 8 and Forestville40 9 agreements paired municipalities
that needed and provided water filtration services and hydrologic
evaluation respectively.
The increased use of intermunicipal agreements after 1994 il-
lustrates the creativity and involvement the parties were willing
to exercise for the preservation of areas extending across munici-
pal borders. The Historic River Towns agreement 410 joined the fi-
nancial and land resources of nine communities to create an area
attractive to tourists. In turn, this agreement helped restore the
economies of the participating municipalities and averted a poten-
tially serious recession as the result of corporation departure from
that area. 411 By encouraging more municipalities to collaborate
on more expansive agreements, the use of the intermunicipal
agreements in the area of land use demonstrates that there are
efficient and effective alternatives to regulation in isolation. The
expansion and enhancement of Home Rule through the implemen-
tation of intermunicipal agreements completes the metamorphic
process of Home Rule, allowing municipalities within New York
State to cooperate and collaborate on the preservation and man-
agement of their own municipalities.
403. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. ToWN
LAw § 284 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney
1995) (The General Municipal Law was not enacted until the following year, 1993);
See also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 119-u (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
404. See Nunda, supra note 23.
405. See Nunda, supra note 23.
406. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 119-o, 239-n (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
407. See Mianus River, supra note 88.
408. See Dunkirk-Fredonia, supra note 94.
409. See Forestville-Chautauqua, supra note 84.
410. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
411. See Historic River Towns, supra note 73.
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VII. Conclusion
Municipalities have a wealth of power at their fingertips
when they implement an intermunicipal agreement. Regulation
of anything is possible, even things not already jointly regulated
by communities participating in intermunicipal agreements. Mu-
nicipalities can now use intermunicipal agreements to enhance
the powers delegated to them almost four decades ago with the
introduction of statutes permitting intermunicipal agreements.
The increased use of agreements in recent years demonstrates
community awareness of resources requiring protection and pres-
ervation, as well as efficient and economically advantageous
agreements for the collaboration on a planning board or the pres-
ervation of an historic district. The future of intermunicipal
agreements is only as large as the municipalities in New York
State choose to make it.
By creating a cohesive unit to regulate issues common to one
region, municipalities can learn to cooperate with one another and
exchange potentially important ideas that would remain silent
without the benefit of collaboration. The implementation of in-
termunicipal agreements within a State may benefit municipali-
ties beyond the participants in the agreement. By demonstrating
that an area can be preserved through an intermunicipal agree-
ment, other municipalities with similar areas or concerns may use
the pre-existing agreement as a template or a guide. The gui-
dance provided by pre-existing intermunicipal agreements can
give rise to new ideas, unrealized aspects, or omissions that are of
great importance. The metamorphosis of Home Rule through the
cocoon of intermunicipal agreements may create a beautiful but-
terfly yet: establishing a cohesive State with the ability to pre-
serve, protect and efficiently regulate those precious areas
requiring more than individual attention.
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